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Secrecy and Robustness for Active Attacks
in Secure Network Coding
and its Application to Network Quantum Key
Distribution
Masahito Hayashi, Masaki Owari, Go Kato, and Ning Cai
Abstract
In network coding, we discuss the effect of sequential error injection on information leakage. We show that
there is no improvement when the operations in the network are linear operations. However, when the operations
in the network contains non-linear operations, we find a counterexample to improve Eve’s obtained information.
Furthermore, we discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network under the secrecy and robustness conditions as
well as under the secrecy condition alone. Finally, we apply our results to network quantum key distribution,
which clarifies the type of network that enables us to realize secure long distance communication via short distance
quantum key distribution.
Index Terms
secrecy analysis, secure network coding, sequential injection, passive attack, active attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding offers a method for securely transmitting information from an authorized sender
to an authorized receiver. Cai and Yeung [1] discussed the secrecy when the malicious adversary, Eve,
wiretaps a subset EE of all the channels in a network. Using the universal hashing lemma [2], [3], [4], the
papers [5], [6] showed the existence of a secrecy code that works universally for any type of eavesdropper
when the cardinality of EE is bounded. In addition, the paper [7] discussed the construction of such a code.
As another type of attack on information transmission via a network, a malicious adversary contaminates
the communication by changing the information on a subset EA of all the channels in the network.
Using an error correction, the papers [8], [9], [10], [11] proposed a method to protect the message from
contamination. That is, we require that the authorized receiver correctly recovers the message, which is
called robustness. Now, for simplicity, we consider the unicast setting. When the transmission rate from
the authorized sender, Alice, to the authorized receiver, Bob, is m0 and the rate of noise injected by Eve
is m1, using the results published in [12], [13] the study [14] showed that there exists a sequence of
asymptotically correctable codes with the rate m0 −m1 if the rate of information leakage to Eve is less
than m0 −m1.
However, there is a possibility that the malicious adversary combines eavesdropping and contamination.
That is, contaminating a part of the channels, the malicious adversary might improve the ability of
eavesdropping while a parallel network offers no such a possibility [38], [39], [37]. In fact, in arbitrarily
varying channel model, noise injection is allowed after Eve’s eavesdropping, but Eve does not eavesdrop
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the channel after Eve’s noise injection [40], [43][41, Table I]. The studies [7], [54] discussed the secrecy
when Eve eavesdrops the information transmitted on the channels in EE after noises are injected in EA,
but they assumes that Eve do not know the information of the injected noise.
In contrast, this paper discusses the secrecy when Eve adds artificial information to the information
transmitted on the channels in EA, eavesdrops the information transmitted on the channels in EE , and
estimates the original message from the eavesdropped information and the information of the injected
noises. We call this type of attack an active attack and call an attack without contamination a passive
attack. Specially, we call each of Eve’s active operations a strategy. Indeed, while the paper [15] discusses
robustness for an active attack, it discusses secrecy only for a passive attack. When EA = EE and any
active attack is available for Eve, she is allowed to arbitrarily modify the information on the channels in
EA sequentially based on the obtained information.
e(1) e(3)
e(2) e(4)
Alice Bob
Fig. 1. One hop relay network.
The aim of this paper is as follows. Firstly, we show that no strategy can improve Eve’s information
when any operation in the network is linear. Then, we discuss a code that satisfies the need for secrecy
and robustness when the transmission rate from Alice to Bob is m0, the rate of noise injected by Eve is
m1, and the rate of information leakage to Eve is m2. In the asymptotic setting, we show the existence of
such a secure protocol with rate m0−m1−m2. We discuss the asymptotic performance when only secrecy
is considered. When Alice and Bob share a small number of initial secret keys and can communicate with
each other via a public channel, we do not impose robustness, but need the correctness only for passive
attack. In such a case, we show the existence of a secure protocol with the rate m0 −m2. This setting is
useful for the secure communication over a network of quantum key distribution systems.
Quantum key distribution enables secure communication between two parties [21]. Recently, finite-
length security analysis has been developed [22], [23], [24] even with multiple photons [25], [26]. Its
commercial use has been well developed for limited transmission distance [27]. However, it is very difficult
to directly connect two distinct parties over long distances via quantum key distribution. To realize long
distance communication with quantum key distribution over short distances, this paper considers a method
to connect them via a network composed of quantum key distribution over short distances. That is, we
generate many pairs of shared secure keys on intermediate nodes by quantum key distribution, where each
pair is composed of two nodes close to each other. The secure keys shared by two nodes realize a secure
channel between the two nodes. Applying the method of network coding to these secure channels, we
realize secure communication between two distinct parties across a long distance. We call this method
network quantum key distribution. When all the nodes are trusted, quantum key distribution guarantees
the security of all the channels between the nodes. However, there is a possibility that a part of nodes
are occupied by Eve. In this case, we do not impose robustness, but need the correctness only for passive
attack. Hence, for the security analysis of this case, we apply the above result to the network composed
of these channels.
Next, to clarify the necessity of the linearity assumption, we discuss the ultimate performance on the
one hop relay network (Fig. 1) with the single shot case. For this aim, we provide a counterexample
of the non-linear coding of the binary case on the network, in which, there exists a strategy to improve
Eve’s information. A concrete description of this non-linear code on the one hop relay network (Fig. 1)
will be given in the main body of this paper. In this example, even if Eve eavesdrops one edge before
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and after the intermediate node as a passive attack, she cannot recover the original message. However,
when she makes an active attack before the intermediate node, she can recover the original message.
This example shows the importance of the assumption of linearity. Similar unexpected properties for a
nonlinear network error correcting code were reported in [36]. Then, we show that the network code is
limited to this counterexample when we impose several natural secrecy conditions to the code on the
one hop relay network (Fig. 1) in the binary case. This discussion shows that no code can guarantee the
security over this type of active attack on the one hop relay network (Fig. 1) in the binary case. However,
in the ternary case, there exists a code such that Eve cannot completely recover the message even with
this type of active attack on the one hop relay network (Fig. 1). To discuss this problem, we introduce a
new concept an “anti-Latin square”, which is an opposite concept to a Latin square.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates our problem and shows
the impossibility of Eve’s eavesdropping under a linear network. Section III discusses the asymptotic
setting, and show the achievability of the asymptotic rate m0 − m1 − m2. Section IV discusses the
asymptotic setting with secrecy without robustness. Using the result of Section IV, Section V considers
the application of obtained results to network quantum key distribution Section VI applies the obtained
result to multiple multicast network. Section VII discusses the ultimate performance on the one hop relay
network. In Section VIII, we state the conclusion.
II. FORMULATION OF LINEAR NETWORK AND REDUCTION THEOREM
A. Single shot setting
1) Generic model: In this subsubsection, we give a generic model, and discuss its relation with concrete
network model in the latter subsubsections. We consider the unicast setting of network coding on a network.
Assume that the authorized sender, Alice, intends to send information to the authorized receiver, Bob, via
the network. We also assume that Alice inputs the input variable X in Fm3q and Bob receives the output
variable YB in F
m4
q . We also assume that the malicious adversary, Eve, wiretaps the information YE in
F
m6
q . Then, we adopt the model with matrices KB ∈ Fm4×m3q and KE ∈ Fm6×m3q , in which,the variables
X , YB, and YE satisfy their relations
YB = KBX, YE = KEX. (1)
We call this attack a passive attack.
In this paper, we address a stronger attack, in which, Eve injects noise Z ∈ Fm5q . Hence, using matrices
HB ∈ Fm4×m5q and HE ∈ Fm6×m5q , we rewrite the relations (1) as
YB = KBX +HBZ, YE = KEX +HEZ, (2)
which is called a wiretap and addition attack model. The i-th injected noise Zi (the i-th component of
Z) is decided by a function αi of YE. In this paper, when a vector has the j-th component xj , the vector
is written as [xj ]1≤j≤a, where the subscript 1 ≤ j ≤ a expresses the range of the index j. Thus, the
set α = [αi]1≤i≤m6 of the functions can be regarded as Eve’s strategy, and we call this attack an active
attack with a strategy α. That is, a pair of a strategy and wiretap and addition attack model is called an
active attack. Here, we treat KB, KE, HB, and HE as deterministic values, and denote the pairs (KB, KE)
and (HB, HE) by K and H , respectively. Hence, our model is written as the triplet (K,H , α). We can
consider several types for conditions for our model. As shown in the latter subsubsections, the triplet
(K,H , α) is decided from the network topology and dynamics of the network.
We set the parameter m0 as
rankKB = m0, (3)
and assume the ranks of HB and KE as
rankHB = m1, rankKE = m2. (4)
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TABLE I
CHANNEL PARAMETERS
m0
Rank of the channel from Alice
to Bob, i.e., rankKB
m1 Rank of Eve’s injected information (rankHB)
m2 Rank of Eve’s wiretapped information (rankKE)
m3 Dimension of Alice’s input information
m4 Dimension of Bob’s observed information
m5 Dimension of Eve’s injected information
m6 Dimension of Eve’s wiretapped information
Then, the parameters are summarized in Table I.
We can consider two types for conditions for our model.
Definition 1. For any value of KEx, there uniquely exists y ∈ Fm6q such that
y = KEx+HEα(y). (5)
This condition is called the uniqueness condition.
Although αi is a function of the vector [YE,j]1≤j≤m6 , it is natural that αi is decided by a part of Eve’s
observed variables when we take the causality with respect to α into account. Since the decision of the
injected noise does not depend on the results of the decision, we introduce the causal condition.
Hence, we choose the subset wi ⊂ {1, . . . , m6} such that the function αi is given as a function of the
vector [YE,j]j∈wi.
Definition 2. Generally, the function αi is given as a function of a part of component of the vector
[YE,j]1,≤j≤m6 . To clarify this point, we choose the subset wi ⊂ {1, . . . , m6} such that the function αi is
given as a function of the vector [YE,j]j∈wi .
(A1) The relation HE;j,i = 0 holds for j ∈ wi. (This condition means that the j-th eavesdropping is
done after the i-th injection for j ∈ wi.)
(A2) The relation w1 ⊂ w2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ wm5 holds.
This condition is called the causal condition.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. When the triplet (K,H , α) satisfies the causal condition, it satisfies the uniqueness condition.
Proof: When the causal condition holds, we show the fact that yj′ is given as a function of KEx for any
j′ ∈ wi by induction with respect to the index i = 1, . . . , m5, which expresses the order of the injected
information. This fact yields the uniqueness condition.
For j ∈ w1, we haveyj = (KEx)j because (HEα(y))j is zero. Hence, the statement with j = 1 holds.
We choose j ∈ wi+1 \ wi. Let zi′ be the i′-th injected information. Due to Conditions (A1) and (A2),
yj − (KEx)j is a function of z1, . . . , zi. Since the causal condition guarantees that z1, . . . , zi are functions
of [yj′]j′∈wi , z1, . . . , zi are functions of KEx. Then, we find that yj is given as a function of KEx for any
j ∈ wi+1 \ wi. That is, the triplet (K,H , α) satisfies the uniqueness condition.
Now, we consider an equivalent condition to the uniqueness condition holds when α is given as a linear
function, i.e., α(y) = Gy for a matrix G. Equation (5) is equivalent to the equation (I −HEG)y = KEx.
Hence, the uniqueness is equivalent to the invertability of the matrix I − HEG. In fact, if the causal
condition does not hold, the matrix I −HEG is not invertible.
2) Construction of passive attack model from directed graph: Next, we discuss how we can obtain
the generic passive attack model (1) from a concrete network structure. We consider the unicast setting
of network coding on a network, which is given as a graph (V,E) with direction, where the set V of
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vertices expresses the set of nodes and the set E := {e(1), . . . , e(m7)} of edges expresses the set of
communication channels, where a communication channel means a packet in network engineering. Here,
the directed graph (V,E) is not necessarily acyclic. When a channel transmits information from a node
u ∈ V to another node v ∈ V , it is written as (u, v) ∈ E.
We assume that the transmission on the edge starts at the tail node of the edge in the order of the
numbers assigned to the edges, which is called the partial time-ordered condition. In the single-use
transmission, the source node has several elements of Fq and sends each of them via its outgoing edges
in the order of assigned number of edges, where Fq is a finite field whose order is a power q of the prime
p. Each intermediate node keeps received information via incoming edges. Then, for each outgoing edge,
the intermediate node calculates one element of Fq from previously received information, and sends it via
the outgoing edge. That is, every outgoing information from a node v(i) via a channel e(j) depends only
on the incoming information into the node v(i) via channels e(j′) such that j′ < j. The operations on all
nodes are assumed to be linear on the finite field Fq with prime power q. Bob receives the information YB
in Fm4q on the edges of a subset EB := {e(ζB(1)), . . . , e(ζB(m4))} ⊂ E, where ζB is a strictly increasing
function from {1, . . . , m4} to {1, . . . , m7}.
Let X˜j be the information on the edge e(j). In the following, we describe the information on the
m8 := m7 −m3 edges that are not directly linked to the source node. When the edge e(j) is a outgoing
edge of the node v(i), the information X˜j is given as a linear combination of the information on the
edges incoming to the node v(i). We have coefficients θj,j′ such that X˜j =
∑
j′ θj,j′X˜j′ , where θj,j′ is
zero unless e(j′) is not an edge incoming to v(i). The partial time-ordered condition implies that
θj,j′ = 0 for j
′ ≥ j. (6)
Now, we define m8 m7 ×m7 matrices. That is, we define the j-th m7 ×m7 matrix Mj as follows. The
j +m3-th column vector of the matrix Mj is defined by [θj+m3,j′]1≤j′≤m7 . The remaining part of Mj is
defined as the identity matrix. Then, we have
YB,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm8 · · ·M1)ζB(j),iXi (7)
While the output of the matrixMm8 · · ·M1 takes values in Fm7q , we focus the projection PB to the subspace
F
m4
q that corresponds to the m4 components observed by Bob. That is, PB is a m4×m7 matrix to satisfy
PB;i,j = δζB(i),j . Similarly, we use the projection PA (a m7 ×m3 matrix) as PA;i,j = δi,j . Due to (7), the
matrix KB := PBMm8 · · ·M1PA satisfies the first equation in (1).
The malicious adversary, Eve, wiretaps the information YE in F
m6
q on the edges of a subset EE :=
{e(ζE(1)), . . . , e(ζE(m6))} ⊂ E, where ζ is a strictly increasing function from {1, . . . , m6} to {1, . . . , m7}.
Then, we have
YE,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm8 · · ·M1)ζE(j),iXi (8)
We employ the projection PE (a m6×m7 matrix) to the subspace Fm6q that corresponds to the m6 compo-
nents eavesdropped by Eve. That is, PE;i,j = δζ(i),j . Then, we obtain the matrix KE as PEMm8 · · ·M1PA.
Due to (7), the matrix KE := PEMm8 · · ·M1PA satisfies the second equation in (1).
In summary the topology and dynamics (operations on the intermediate nodes) of the network, including
the places of attached edges decides the graph (V,E), the coefficients θi,j , and functions ζB, ζE, uniquely
gives the two matrices KB and KE. Here, we emphasize that we do not assume the acyclic condition for
the graph (V,E). That is, due to the partial time-ordered condition, we can uniquely define our matrices
KB and KE , which is a similar way to [53, Section V-B]
1.
1Λ of Ahlswede-Cai-Li-Yeung corresponds to the number of edges that are not connected to the source node in our paper.
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3) Construction of active attack model from directed graph: We construct the generic active attack
model from a concrete network structure. We assume that Eve injects the noise in a part of edges EA ⊂ E
as well as eavesdrops the edges EE and assume the condition
EA ∩ {1, . . . , m3} = ∅. (9)
In fact, when the condition (9) does not hold, the following new graph satisfies the condition (9). We add
new vertexes on the edges {e(1), . . . , e(m3)}, and divides these edges into two edges. Then, these tail
parts keep the original numbers, and these head parts are assigned the numbers {m3 + 1, . . . , 2m3}. The
numbers of the remaining edges are changed by adding m3. This modified graph satisfies the condition
(9).
The elements of the subset EA is expressed as EA = {e(η(1)), . . . , e(η(m5))} by using a function
η from {1, . . . , m5} to {1, . . . , m7}. To give the matrices HB and HE, modifying the matrix Mj , we
define the new matrix M ′j as follows The j +m3-th column vector of the new matrix M
′
j is defined by
[θj+m3,j′ + δj+m3,j′]1≤j′≤m7 . The remaining part of M
′
j is defined as the identity matrix. Then, we have
YB,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm8 · · ·M1)ζB(j),iXi +
m5∑
i′=1
(M ′m8 · · ·M ′1)ζB(j),η(i′)Zi′ (10)
YE,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm8 · · ·M1)ζE(j),iXi +
m5∑
i′=1
(M ′m8 · · ·M ′1 − I)ζE(j),η(i′)Zi′ . (11)
When Eve eavesdrops the edges EE ∩ EA, she obtains the information on EE ∩ EA before her noise
injection. Hence, to express her obtained information on EE ∩ EA, we need to substract her injected
information on EE ∩ EA. Hence, we need −I in the second term of (11). We introduce the projection
PE,A (an m7×m5 matrix) as PA;i,j = δi,η(j). Due to (10) and (11), the matrices HB := PBM ′m8 · · ·M ′1PE,A
and HE := PE(M
′
m8
· · ·M ′1 − I)PE,A satisfy conditions (2) with the matrices KB and KE, respectively.
This model (KB , KE, HB, HE) is called the wiretap and addition model determined by (V,E) and
(EE , EA, {θi,j}), which expresses the topology and dynamics.
To discuss the active attack, we consider the condition for the strategy α in addition to the wiretap and
addition attack model. One may assume that the tail of the edge e(j) sends the information to the edge
e(j) after the head of the edge e(j − 1) receives the information to the edge e(j − 1), which we call the
full time-ordered condition. However, the full time ordered condition does not hold in general even when
we reorder the numbers assigned to the edges. Although we can discuss the active attack only with the
partial time-ordered condition, we discuss it under the full time-ordered condition first.
When the full time-ordered condition holds, the function η is a strictly increasing function from
{1, . . . , m5} to {1, . . . , m7}. Since Eve can choose the information to be added on the edge e(i) ∈ EA
based on the obtained information YE , the added error Zi is given as a function αi of the vector [YE,j]j∈wi
with wi := {j|η(i) ≥ ζE(j)}. Since the function η is strictly increasing, Condition (A2) for the causal
condition holds. Since the relation (6) implies that M ′m8 · · ·M ′1− I is a lower triangular matrix with zero
diagonal elements, the strictly increasing property of η yield that
HE;j,i = 0 when η(i) ≥ ζ(j), (12)
which implies Condition (A1) for the causal condition. In this way, the full time-ordered condition implies
the causal condition.
However, in the realistic setting, it is possible that Eve might intercept (i.e., wiretap and contaminate)
the information of an edge before the head node of the previous edge receives the information on the
edge. Hence, we consider the case when the partial time-ordered condition holds, but the full time-ordered
condition does not necessarily hold2. That is, the function η from {1, . . . , m5} to E is injective but is
2For an example, we consider the following case. Eve gets the information on the first edge. Then, she gets the information on the second
edge before she hands over the information on the first edge to the tail node of the first edge. In this case, she can change the information
on the first edge based on the information on the first and second edges. Then, the time-ordered condition (12) does not hold.
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not necessarily monotone increasing. Then, we choose the sets wi to satisfy Condition (A2) for the
causal condition so that the added error Zi is given as a function αi of the vector [YE,j]j∈wi . The partial
time-ordered condition implies the relation
j < γ(i) := min{ζE(j′)|θζE(j′),i 6= 0} (13)
for j ∈ wi, which implies the following condition; For j ∈ wi, there is no sequence j = j1 > j2, . . . >
jl = η(i) such that
θji,ji+1 6= 0. (14)
This condition implies Condition (A1) for the causal condition. That is, even when the full time-ordered
condition does not hold, the causal condition can be naturally derived.
Now, we consider the optimal choice of η, {wi} for Eve. That is, we choose the subset wi as large
as possible under the partial time-ordered condition and Condition (A2). Then, we choose the bijective
function ηo from {1, . . . , m5} to the set of indexes of elements of EA such that γ ◦ ηo is monotone
increasing. Then, we define wo,i := {j|ζE(j) < γ(ηo(i))}, which satisfies Conditions (A1) and (A2) for
the causal condition. Further, for the above choice η, {wi}, the condition (13) implies wη◦η−1o (i) ⊂ wo,i,
i.e., wo,i is the largest subset under the partial time-ordered condition and Condition (A2), which shows
the optimality of ηo, {wo,i}. Although the choice of ηo is not unique, the choice of wo,η−1o (i) for e(i) ∈ EA
is unique.
4) Examples: In this subsubsection, as an example, we consider the network given in Figs. 2 and 3.
Alice sends the variablesX1, . . . , X4 ∈ Fq to nodes v(1), v(2), v(3), and v(4) via the edges e(1), e(2), e(3),
and e(4), respectively. The edges e(5), . . . , e(12) send the elements received in the tail node. The edges
e(13) and e(14) send the sum of two elements received in the tail node. The received elements via the
edges e(11), e(12), e(13), and e(14) are written as YB,1, YB,2, YB,3, and YB,4, respectively. Then, the matrix
KB is given as
KB =


1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1

 . (15)
Then, m0 = 4.
Now, we assume that Eve eavesdrops and contaminates the edges e(1), e(2), e(6), e(7), and e(13).
We denote the observed information and the injected information on the edges e(1), e(2), e(6), e(7), and
e(13) by YE,1, YE,2, YE,3, YE,4, YE,5 and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5. In Fig. 4, Eve adds Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5 in edges
e(1), e(2), e(6), e(7), and e(13). Here, Eve injects noises Then, the matrices HB, KE, and HE are given
as
HB =


1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0

 , KE =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0

 , HE =


0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0

 . (16)
Then, rankHB = rankKE = 2. Eve can choose the function η as
η(1) = 2, η(2) = 1, η(3) = 7, η(4) = 6, η(5) = 13, (17)
and choose the subsets wi as
w1 = w2 = {1, 2}, w3 = w4 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, w5 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. (18)
This case satisfies Conditions (A1) and (A2). Hence, this model satisfies the causal condition. Lemma 1
guarantees that it also satisfies the uniqueness condition.
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v(1)
Alice Bob
v(2)
v(3)
v(4) v(8)
v(5)
v(6)
v(7)
e(2)
e(3)
e(4)
e(1)
e(5)
e(6)
e(7)
e(8)
e(9)
e(10)
e(11)
e(13)
e(12)
e(14)
Fig. 2. Network of Subsubsection II-A4 with name of edges
v(1)
Alice Bob
1X
2X
3X
4X
1X
1X
2X
3X
3X
4X
1X
3X
1 2X X+
3 4X X+
v(2)
v(3)
v(4) v(8)
v(5)
v(6)
v(7)
Fig. 3. Network of Subsubsection II-A4 with network flow
n(1)
Alice Bob
n(2)
n(3)
n(4) n(8)
n(5)
n(6)
n(7)
e(2)
e(3)
e(4)
e(1)
e(5)
e(6)
e(7)
e(8)
e(9)
e(10)
e(11)
e(13)
e(12)
e(14)
1X
2X
3X
4X
2Z+
1Z+
4Z+ 3Z+
5Z+
Fig. 4. Network of Subsubsection II-A4 with addition attack
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5) Wiretap and replacement model: In the above subsubsections, we have discussed the case when Eve
injects the noise in the edges EA as well as eavesdrops the edges EE . In this subsubsection, we assume
that EA = EE and Eve eavesdrops the edges EE and replaces the information on the edges EA by other
information. While this assumption implies m5 = m6 and and the image of η equals the image of ζE,
the function η does not necessarily equal the function ζE because the order that Eve sends her replaced
information to the heads of edges does not necessarily equal the order that Eve intercepts the information
on the edges. This case also belongs to general wiretap and addition model (2) as follows. Modifying the
matrix Mj , we define the new matrix M
′′
j as follows. When there is an index i such that ζE(i) = j, the
j +m3-th column vector of the new matrix M
′′
j is defined by [δj+m3,j′]1≤j′≤m7 and the remaining part of
M ′′j is defined as the identity matrix. Otherwise, M
′′
j is defined to be Mj . Also, we define another matrix
F as follows. The ζE(i)-th column vector of the new matrix F is defined by [θζE(i),j′ ]1≤j′≤m7 and the
remaining part of F is defined as the identity matrix. Under the condition (9), we have
YB,j =
m3∑
i=1
(M ′′m8 · · ·M ′′1 )ζB(j),iXi +
m5∑
i′=1
(M ′′m8 · · ·M ′′1 )ζB(j),η(i′)Zi′ (19)
YE,j =
m3∑
i=1
(FM ′′m8 · · ·M ′′1 )ζE(j),iXi +
m5∑
i′=1
(FM ′′m8 · · ·M ′′1 )ζE(j),η(i′)Zi′. (20)
Then, we choose matricesK ′B,K
′
E ,H
′
B, andH
′
E asK
′
B := PBM
′′
m8
· · ·M ′′1PA,K ′E := PEFM ′′m8 · · ·M ′′1PA,
H ′B := PBM
′′
m8
· · ·M ′′1P TE , and H ′E := PEFM ′′m8 · · ·M ′′1P TE , which satisfy conditions (2) due to (19) and
(20). This model (K ′B, K
′
E , H
′
B, H
′
E) is called the wiretap and replacement model determined by (V,E)
and (EE , {θi,j}).
Next, we discuss the strategy α′ under the matrices K ′B , K
′
E, H
′
B , and H
′
E such that the added error Zi
is given as a function α′i of the vector [YE,j]j∈wi . Since the decision of the injected noise does not depend
on the results of the decision, we impose the causal condition defined in Definition 2 for the subsets wi.
When the relation j ∈ wi holds with ζE(j) = η(i), a strategy α′ on the wiretap and replacement model
(K ′B , K
′
E , H
′
B , H
′
E) determined by (V,E) and (EE , {θi,j}) is written by another strategy α on the wiretap
and addition model KB , KE, HB , and HE determined by (V,E) and (EE , EE, {θi,j}), which is defined as
α[YE,j′]j′∈wi := α
′[YE,j′]j′∈wi − YE,j. In particular, due to the condition (6), the optimal choice ηo, {wo,i}
under the partial time-ordered condition satisfies the relation j ∈ wo,i holds with ζE(j) = ηo(i). That
is, under the partial time-ordered condition, the strategy on the wiretap and replacement model can be
written by another strategy on the wiretap and addition model.
However, if there is no synchronization among vertexes, Eve can inject the replaced information to the
head of an edge before the tail of the edge sends the information to the edge. Then, the partial time-ordered
condition does not hold. In this case, the relation j ∈ wi does not necessarily hold with ζE(j) = η(i).
Hence, a strategy α′ on the wiretap and replacement model (K ′B , K
′
E , H
′
B , H
′
E) cannot be necessarily
written as another strategy on the wiretap and addition model (KB , KE, HB , HE).
To see this fact, we discuss an example given in Subsubsection II-A4. In this example, the network
structure of the wiretap and replacement attack model is given by Fig. 5. In Fig. 5, we change the order
of replacement. The function η is given as
η(1) = 6, η(2) = 7, η(3) = 13, η(4) = 1, η(5) = 2, (21)
and choose the subsets wi as
w1 = w2 = {1, 2}, w3 = w4 = w4 = {1, 2, 5}. (22)
This case satisfies Conditions (A1) and (A2). Hence, this attack satisfies the causal condition. In contrast,
this strategy cannot be written as a causal strategy on the wiretap and addition model KB , KE, HB, and
HE because the replaced information on the edges e(1) and e(2) depend on the obtained information Y5
on the edge e(13).
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Fig. 5. Network of Subsubsection II-A4 with wiretap and replacement attack. The edges e′(1), e′(2), e′(6), e′(7), and e′(13) are the edges
to inject the replaced information.
B. Finite-length setting and reduction theorem
Now, we consider the n-transmission setting, where Alice uses the same network n times to send
a message to Bob. Alice’s input variable (Eve’s added variable) is given as a matrix Xn ∈ Fm3×nq (a
matrix Zn ∈ Fm5×nq ), and Bob’s (Eve’s) received variable is given as a matrix Y nB ∈ Fm4×nq (a matrix
Y nE ∈ Fm6×nq ). We assume that the topology and dynamics of the network and the edge attacked by Eve
do not change during n transmissions. Their relation is given as
Y nB = KBX
n +HBZ
n, (23)
Y nE = KEX
n +HEZ
n. (24)
Then, we assume that Eve’s strategy αn is given as a function from Y nE to Z
n. We extend the uniqueness
condition to the n-transmission version.
Definition 3. For any value of KEx
n, there uniquely exists yn ∈ Fm6×nq such that
yn = KEx
n +HEα
n(y). (25)
This condition is called the uniqueness condition.
Here, there are two possibilities to define the time ordering of the transmission. In the first case, while
Xn ∈ Fm3×nq is composed of n column vectors, the transmission of the i-th column vector is performed
in the network after the transmission of the i− 1-th column vector. Hence, Eve is allowed to decide the
attack αn based on the previous memory. In the second case, n transmissions of the j-th edge is performed
after n transmissions of the j − 1-th edge. In this way, possible strategies αn depends on this choice of
the time ordering. However, in both cases, Eve’s strategy αn needs to satisfy the uniqueness condition,
which can be shown in the same way as Lemma 1. Hence, we only impose the uniqueness condition.
We formulate a code to discuss the secrecy. Let M and L be the message set and the set of values
of the scramble random number, which is often called the private randomness. Then, an encoder is given
as a function φn from M× L to Fm3×nq , and the decoder is given as ψn from Fm4×nq to M. That is,
the decoder does not use the scramble random number L because it is not shared with the decoder. Our
code is the pair (φn, ψn), and is denoted by Φn. Then, we denote the message and the scramble random
number as M and L. The cardinality of M is called the size of the code and is denoted by |Φn|. More
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generally, when we focus on a sequence {ln} instead of {n}, an encoder φn is a function from M×L
to Fm3×lnq , and the decoder ψn is a function from F
m4×ln
q to M.
Here, we treat KB, KE, HB, and HE as deterministic values, and denote the pairs (KB, KE) and
(HB, HE) by K and H , respectively. Also, we assume that the matrices K and H are not changed
during transmission. In the following, we fix Φn,K,H , α
n. As a measure of the leaked information,
we adopt the mutual information I(M ; Y nE , Z
n) between M and Eve’s information Y nE and Z
n. Since the
variable Zn is given as a function of Y nE , we have I(M ; Y
n
E , Z
n) = I(M ; Y nE ). Since the leaked information
is given as a function of Φn,K,H , α
n in this situation, we denote it by I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , α
n]. If we
always choose Zn = 0, the attack is the same as the passive attack. This strategy is denoted by αn = 0.
When K,H are treated as random variables independent of M,L, the leaked information is given as the
expectation of I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , α
n]. This probabilistic setting expresses the following situation. Eve
cannot necessarily choose edges to be attacked by herself. But she knows the positions of the attacked
edges, and chooses her strategy depending on the attacked edges.
Remark 1. It is better to remark that there are two kinds of formulations in network coding even when
the network has only one sender and one receiver. Many papers [1], [8], [9], [19], [20] adopt the
formulation, where the users can control the coding operation in intermediate nodes. However, this paper
adopts another formulation, in which, the users can control the coding operation only for the input variable
X and the output variable YB like the papers [12], [13], [14], [15], [7], [54]. In the former setting,
it is often allowed to employ the private randomness in intermediate nodes. However, in our setting,
since no coding operation is allowed in intermediate nodes, the private randomness is not employed in
intermediate nodes. Remember that the operations in intermediate nodes are linear and are not changed
during transmission. Here, we define the coding operation is considered to be an operation across several
alphabets.
In addition, any linear operation over the vector space Fm3nq is allowed for the encoding process, our
formulation can be regarded as vector linearity.
Now, we have the following reduction theorem.
Theorem 1 (Reduction Theorem). When the triplet (K,H , αn) satisfies the uniqueness condition, Eve’s
information Y nE (α
n) with strategy αn can be calculated from Eve’s information Y nE (0) with strategy 0 (the
passive attack), and Y nE (0) is also calculated from Y
n
E (α
n). Hence, we have the equation
I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K, 0, 0] = I(M ; Y
n
E )[Φn,K,H , 0] = I(M ; Y
n
E )[Φn,K,H , α
n]. (26)
This theorem shows that the information leakage of the active attack with the strategy αn is the same
as the information leakage of the passive attack. Hence, to guarantee the secrecy under an arbitrary active
attack, it is sufficient to show secrecy under the passive attack.
Proof: Since the first equation follows from the definition, we show the second equation. We define two
random variables Y nE (0) := KEX
n and Y nE (α
n) := KEX
n +HEZ
n. Due to the uniqueness condition of
Y nE (α
n), for each Y nE (0) = KEX
n, we can uniquely identify Y nE (α
n). Therefore, we have I(M ; Y nE (0)) ≥
I(M ; Y nE (α
n)). Conversely, since Y nE (0) is given as a function of Y
n
E (α
n), Zn, and HE, we have the
opposite inequality.
Remark 2 (Number of choices). To compare passive and active attacks, we count the number of choices
of both attacks. While the passive attack is characterized by the matrix KE, the information leaked to
Eve in the passive attack depends only on the kernel of the matrix KE. To characterize the information
leaked to Eve, we consider two matrices to be equivalent when their kernels are the same. In a passive
attack, when we fix the rank of KE (the dimension of leaked information), by taking into account the
equivalent class, the number of possible choices is upper bounded by qm2(m3−m2). With an active attack,
this calculation is more complicated. For simplicity, we consider the case with n = 1. To consider the
minimum number of choices of αn, we assume condition (12). (When we do not make this assumption, the
number of choices is larger.) We do not count the choice for the inputs on the edge η(i) with η(i) ≥ ζ(m6)
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because it does not affect Eve’s information. Then, even when we fix the matrices KE , HE, the number
of choices of αn is
q
∑
i:η(i)<ζ(m6)
qTi , (27)
where Ti := max{j|η(i) ≥ ζ(j)}. Notice that Ti = i when EA = EE . If we count the choice on
the remaining edges, we need to multiply q
∑
i:η(i)≥ζ(m6)
qTi
on (27). For a generic natural number n, the
number of choices of αn is
qn
∑
i:η(i)<ζ(m6)
qnTi . (28)
Remark 3. Theorem 1 discusses the unicast case. It can be trivially extended to the multicast case because
we do not discuss the decoder. It can also be extended to the multiple unicast case, whose network is
composed of several pairs of sender and receiver. When there are k pairs in this setting, the messages
M and the scramble random numbers L have the forms (M1, . . . ,Mk) and (L1, . . . , Lk). Thus, we can
apply Theorem 1 to the multiple unicast case.
Remark 4. One may consider that Theorem 1 requires the acyclic condition for the network. However,
this condition is not needed because the statement of this theorem follows from the uniqueness condition.
That is, when a cyclic network does not satisfy the condition (26), it does not satisfy the uniqueness
condition.
Remark 5. One may consider the following type of attack for an integer n when Alice sends the i-th
transmission after Bob receives the i − 1-th transmission. Eve changes the edge to be attacked in the
i-th transmission dependently of the information that Eve obtains in the previous i − 1 transmissions.
Such an attack was discussed in [57] when there is no noise injection. Theorem 1 does not consider
such a situation because it assumes that Eve attacks the same edges for each transmission to make
consistency with the latter sections (Sections III and IV). However, Theorem 1 can be applied to this
kind of attack in the following way. That is, we find that Eve’s information with noise injection can be
simulated by Eve’s information without noise injection even when the attacked edges are changed in the
above way. When we have n transmission over the graph (V,E), we consider the graph (Vn, En), where
Vn := {(v, i)}v∈V,1≤i≤n and En := {(e, i)}e∈E,1≤i≤n and (v, i) and (e, i) express the vertex v and the
edge e on the i-th transmission, respectively. Hence, when we apply Theorem 1 with n = 1 to the graph
(Vn, En), we obtain the above statement.
III. ASYMPTOTIC SETTING WITH SECRECY AND ROBUSTNESS
Next, under the same assumption as that in Section VII-B2, we consider the asymptotic setting by
taking account of robustness as well as secrecy while Eve’s strategy α is assumed to satisfy the uniqueness
condition. We previously assumed that the matrices KB , KE , HB , and HE , i.e., the topology and dynamics
of the network and the edge attacked by Eve do not change during n transmissions. Now, we assume that
Eve knows these matrices and that Alice and Bob know none of them because Alice and Bob often do
not know the topology and/nor dynamics of the network and/nor the places of the edges attacked by Eve.
However, due to the limitation of Eve’s ability, we assume that the dimension of the information leaked
to Eve and the rank of the information injected by Eve are limited to m2 and m1, respectively. Indeed,
when the original network is given by the graph (V,E) and Eve eavesdrops at most m′6 edges and injects
the noise at most m′5 edges, we have m2 ≤ m′6 and m1 ≤ m′5. This evaluation is till valid even in the
wiretap and replacement model. Therefore, it is natural to assume the upper bounds of these dimensions.
(See Remark 6.)
When Eve adds the error Zn, there is a possibility that Bob cannot recover the original information
M . This problem is called robustness, and may be regarded as a kind of error correction. Under the
conventional error correction, the error Zn is treated as a random variable subject to a certain distribution.
However, our problem is different from the conventional error correction because the decoding error
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probability depends on the strategy αn. Hence, we denote it by Pe[Φn,K,H , α
n]. Then, the following
proposition is known.
Proposition 1 ([12], [13], [14], [15]). Assume that m2 +m1 < m0. There exists a sequence of codes Φn
of block-length ln on a finite field Fq whose message set is F
kn
q such that
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m1 (29)
lim
n→∞
max
K,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H , α
n] = 0, (30)
where the maximum is taken with respect to (KB, HB, KE, HE) ∈ Fm4×m3q ×Fm4×m5q ×Fm6×m3q ×Fm6×m5q
with (3) and (4). Here, there is no restriction for the choice of m5 and m6.
The existing proof of Proposition 1 is given as a combination of several results. Each part of the existing
proof is hard to read because it omits the detail derivation. Hence, for readers’ convenience, we give its
alternative proof in Appendix A, which has an improvement over the existing proof. Combining Theorem
1 and Proposition 1, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. We assume that m2 +m1 < m0. There exists a sequence of codes Φn of block-length ln on
finite field Fq whose message set is F
kn
q such that
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m1 −m2 (31)
lim
n→∞
max
K,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H , α
n] = 0 (32)
max
K,H
max
αn
I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , α
n] = 0, (33)
where the maximum is taken in the same way as with Proposition 1.
Before our proof, we prepare basic facts about information-theoretic security. We focus on a random
hash function fR from X to Y with random variable R deciding the function fR. It is called universal2
when
Pr{fR(x) = y} ≤ |Y||X | (34)
for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
For s ∈ (0, 1], we define the conditional Re´nyi entropy H1+s(X|Z) for the joint distribution PXZ as
[4]
H1+s(X|Z) := −1
s
log
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
∑
x∈X
PX|Z(x|z)1+s, (35)
which is often denoted by H↑1+s(X|Z) in [17], [18]. When X obeys the uniform distribution, we have
H1+s(X|Z) ≥ log |X ||Z| . (36)
Proposition 2. [2], [3][4, Theorem 1]
I(fR(X);Z|R) ≤ e
s log |Y|−H1+s(X|Z)
s
(37)
for s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof of Theorem 2: We choose a sequence of codes {Φn = (φn, ψn)} given in Corollary 1. We fix
k¯n := kn −m2ln − ⌈
√
ln⌉. Now, we choose a universal2 linear surjective random hash function fR from
F
kn
q to F
k¯n
q .
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To construct our code, we consider a virtual protocol as follows. First, Alice sends a larger message
M by using the code Φn, and Bob recovers it. Second, Alice randomly chooses R deciding the hash
function fR and sends it to Bob via a public channel. Finally, Alice and Bob apply the hash function fR
to their message, and denote the result value by M¯ so that Alice and Bob share the information M¯ with
a probability of close to 1.
Since the conditional mutual information between M¯ and Y lnE depends on Φn,K,H , α
n, we denote it by
I(M¯ ; Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H , αn]. Theorem 1 shows I(M¯ ; Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H , αn] = I(M¯ ; Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H , 0],
which does not depend onKB, HB, HE and depends only onKE . Now, we evaluate this leaked information
via a similar idea to that reported in [5]. Since inequality (36) implies that H1+s(M |Y lnE ) ≥ (kn −
lnm2) log q, Proposition 2 yields
I(M¯ ; Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H , 0] ≤
es(k¯n log q−H1+s(M |Y
ln
E
))
s
≤q
s(k¯n−kn+lnm2)
s
≤ q
−s⌈√ln⌉
s
. (38)
We set s = 1. For each matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q satisfying rankKE = m2, Markov inequality guarantees
that the inequality
I(M¯ ; Y lnE )[Φn,K,H , 0]|R=r ≤ q−⌈
√
ln⌉+c+1 (39)
holds at least with probability 1− q−c−1. Since the number of matrices KE satisfying rankKE = m2 is
upper bounded by qm6m3 , there exists a matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q such that rankKE = m2 and (39) does
not hold at most with probability qm6m3q−c−1. Hence, (39) holds for any matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q satisfying
rankKE = m2 at least with probability 1− qm6m3q−c−1. Letting c be m6m3, we have
I(M¯ ; Y lnE )[Φn,K,H , 0]|R=r ≤ q−⌈
√
ln⌉+m6m3+1 (40)
for any matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q satisfying rankKE = m2 at least with probability 1 − 1q . Therefore, there
exists a suitable hash function fr such that
I(M¯ ; Y lnE )[Φn,K,H , 0]|R=r ≤ q−⌈
√
ln⌉+m6m3+1,
which goes to zero as n goes to infinity because m6m3 + 1 is a constant. Since the code is linear, Eve
observes a subspace of input information Fk¯nq . Hence, the amount of leaked information is an integer times
of log q. Hence, as discussed in [6], when ln is sufficiently large, there exists a suitable hash function fr
such that
I(M¯ ; Y lnE )[Φn,K,H , 0]|R=r = 0.
Now, we return to the construction of real codes. We choose the setsM and L as Fk¯nq and Fm2ln+⌈
√
ln⌉
q ,
respectively. Since the linearity and the surjectivity of fr implies that |f−1r (x)| = qm2ln+⌈
√
ln⌉ for any
element x ∈ M, we can define the invertible function f¯r from M×L to the domain of fr, i.e., Fknq such
that f¯−1r (f
−1
r (x)) = {x} × L for any element x ∈ M. This condition implies that fr ◦ f¯r(x, y) = x for
(x, y) ∈ M× L. Then, we define our encoder as φ¯n := φn ◦ f¯r, and our decoder as ψ¯n := fr ◦ ψn. The
sequence of codes {(φ¯n, ψ¯n)} satisfies the desired requirements.
Remark 6. If we replace the condition (4) by the condition
rankHB ≤ m1, rankKE ≤ m2, (41)
the Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 still hold due to the following reason. For (KB, HB, KE, HE) to
satisfy (3) and (41), there exists (K ′B, H
′
B, K
′
E, H
′
E) to satisfy (3) and (4) such that Pe[Φn,K,H , α
n] ≤
Pe[Φn,K
′,H ′, αn] and I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , α
n] ≤ I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K ′,H ′, αn]. Hence, the Proposition 1
and Theorem 2 still hold under this modification.
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Remark 7 (Efficient code construction). We discuss an efficient construction of our code from a code
(φn, ψn) given in Corollary 1 with q = 2. A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to
be a universal2 linear surjective hash function, which is given by a concatenation (T (S), I) of the
(m2ln + ⌈
√
ln⌉) × k¯n Toeplitz matrix T (S) and the k¯n × k¯n identity matrix I [16], where S is the
random seed used to decide the Toeplitz matrix and belongs to Fkn−12 . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices
are particularly useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast
Fourier transform algorithm with complexity O(ln log ln).
When the random seed S is fixed, the encoder for our code is given as follows. By using the scramble
random variable L ∈ Fm2ln+⌈
√
ln⌉)
2 , the encoder φ¯n is given as φn
((
I −T (S)
0 I
)(
M
L
))
because
(I, T (S))
(
I −T (S)
0 I
)
= (I, 0). (The multiplication of Toeplitz matrix T (S) can be performed as a
part of a circulant matrix. For example, the reference [16, Appendix C] provides a method to give a
circulant matrix.). A more efficient construction for univeral2 hash function is discussed in [16]. Hence,
the decoder ψ¯n is given as Y
ln
B 7→ (I, T (S))ψn(Y lnB ).
Remark 8. Here, we clarify the difference between our results and the setting of the preceding papers
[7], [15], [54], [55], which consider correctness and secrecy. Their secrecy analysis is different from
our analysis although the code construction in [7], [15], [54] does not depend on the concrete form of
matrices KB, KE, HB, HE, which is similar to our code construction.
While the papers [42], [15] considered correctness when the error exists, it discusses the secrecy only
when there is no error. Similarly, the paper [55] considers a different active adversary model, in which,
it discusses the node-repair and data-reconstruction operations even in the presence of such an attack
while the model of passive eavesdroppers in the paper [55] discusses the secrecy with respect to the
message to be transmitted. Indeed, the papers [42], [15] provided a statement similar to Theorem 2.
However, it showed only Eq. (32) and limn→∞maxK,H I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , 0] = 0 instead of (33) by
combining Proposition 4 and the result of the paper [42]. To show (33), we need to employ Theorem 1.
If we do not apply Theorem 1 in step (40) in our proof of Theorem 2, we have to multiply the number
of choices of strategy αn. As a generalization of (27), this number is given in (28), which grows up
double-exponentially. Hence, our proof of Theorem 2 does not work without the use of Theorem 1.
While the papers [7, Proposition 5][54] consider the secrecy when the error exists, it addresses the
amount of leaked information only when the eavesdropper does not know the information of the noise.
That is, they evaluate the mutual information between M and Y nE . However, our analysis evaluates the
leaked information when the eavesdropper knows the information of the noise. That is, we address the
mutual information between M and the pair (Y nE , Z
n).
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SETTING WITH SECRECY
Next, we consider the case when only the secrecy is imposed and the robustness is not imposed. In
this case, we impose the correctness of the case with passive attack instead of the robustness. That is, we
impose the following condition.
lim
n→∞
max
K
Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = lim
n→∞
max
K,H
Pe[Φn,K,H , 0] = 0. (42)
Here, as the secrecy, we impose the following condition.
max
K,H
max
αn
I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , α
n] = 0. (43)
Here, both maximums are taken with respect to (KB, KE) ∈ Fm4×m3q × Fm2×m3q with (3). We notice that
the situation of the correctness (42) is different from the situation of the secrecy (43). The correctness (42)
addresses only the case with passive attack, but the secrecy (43) addresses the cases with active attack.
The following is the reason why we consider this setting.
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Consider that Alice and Bob can communicate with each other by using a public channel, which allows
Alice and Bob to communicate with each other without any error, but the secrecy is not guaranteed. In this
case, when Alice and Bob share a sufficient number of secret random variables, they can communicate
with each other securely. To share such secret random variables, they can send them via the secure
network coding. Now, we consider this problem in an asymptotic setting, where the secrecy condition
(33) is definitely required. However, robustness (32) is not necessary because they can check whether or
not the transmitted random number is correct by using an error verification test with a public channel
after the transmission [51, Section VIII] [50, Step 4 of Protocol 2]. Hence, due to the error verification, it
is sufficient to impose condition (42) instead of (32). Indeed, it is not easy to check whether H and αn
are 0 even when the error verification test is passed because there is a possibility that the error caused by
H and αn can be corrected by the code Φn. Since we cannot ignore the possibility that H and α
n are
not 0, we cannot relax the secrecy condition (43). This setting appears when we consider quantum key
distribution, as explained in Section V. We use the following theorem to analyze this problem.
Theorem 3. There exists a sequence of codes Φn of block-length ln on finite field Fq whose message set
is Fknq such that conditions (42) and (43) and
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m2 (44)
holds.
From the definition, we see that Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = Pe[Φn,K,H , 0]. Also, note that Pe[Φn,K, 0, α
n]
does not depend on KE. Further, the rate m0 − m2 is asymptotically optimal, i.e., there is no code
surpassing the rate m0 −m2, which follows from the converse part of the conventional wire-tap channel
[28], [29].
To show the above theorem, as a special case of Theorem 2 with m1 = 0, we prepare the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. There exists a sequence of codes Φn of block-length ln on finite field Fq whose message set
is Fknq such that
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m2 (45)
max
K
I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (46)
lim
n→∞
max
K
Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (47)
where the maximum is taken with respect to (KB, KE) ∈ Fm4×m3q × Fm2×m3q under the condition (3).
Combining Corollary 1 and Theorem 1, we obtain Theorem 3.
Here, we compare existing results with Corollary 1. As a similar result to Corollary 1, the following
proposition is known. Since Corollary 1 does not require the assumptions m3 = m4 = m0 and KB = I ,
Corollary 1 is slightly advantageous. Hence, Theorem 3 is a stronger statement than the following existing
statement.
Proposition 3 ([6, Theorem 7],[7]). We assume that m3 = m4 = m0 and KB = I . There exists a sequence
of codes Φn of block-length n on finite field Fq whose message set is F
kn
q such that
lim
n→∞
kn
n
= m0 −m2 (48)
lim
n→∞
max
K
I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (49)
lim
n→∞
Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (50)
where the maximum is taken with respect to KE ∈ Fm2×m0q .
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V. APPLICATION TO NETWORK QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
In this section, to realize long distance communication with quantum key distribution, using the result in
Section IV, we consider a network of quantum key distribution as follows. The authorized sender, Alice,
is connected to the authorized receiver, Bob, via the network given by the graph (V,E) with |E| = k. A
linear operation is fixed in each node so that we have the relation YB = KBX with Alice’s input X and
Bob’s output YB . Then, if secure information transmission is available on each edge, secure communication
from Alice to Bob can be realized. For every edge (u, v) ∈ E, the distant nodes u and v generate secure
common keys by quantum key distribution. That is, k pairs of secure keys are generated by quantum key
distribution. In the following, we discuss how we can make secure message transmission from Alice to
Bob by using these k pairs of secure keys with public channels. This kind of secure communication is
called network quantum key distribution.
First, we consider the case when all nodes are authenticated. In this case, Alice can securely send her
message X to Bob in the following way. Let Xi be the random variable to be transmitted on the i-th edge.
Let Zi be the secure keys generated in the i-th edge by quantum key distribution. When Xi is directly
transmitted, this information transmission is not secure. To realize security, Yi := Xi + Zi is transmitted
on the i-th edge, instead. Then, a secure transmission in each edge is realized. Hence, due to the above
relation YB = KBX , secure communication from Alice to Bob can be realized.
However, it is very difficult to guarantee security when a part of nodes are occupied by Eve. Such
a model is often called a node adversary model while the model introduced in Section II is called an
edge adversary model. The main problem with network quantum key distribution is realization of secure
communication from Alice to Bob under a node adversary model. To investigate the security in the node
adversary model, we convert a given node adversary model to a special case of the edge adversary model
as in [43]. In an edge adversary model, Eve wiretaps and contaminates the information only on the edges
EE . To apply the model to the current situation, we consider that all the edges linked to the nodes occupied
by Eve are wiretapped and controlled by Eve. When these occupied nodes communicate each other, Eve’s
attack is active attack. That is, analysis for active attack is essential. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2 to
the security analysis of the direct transmission of secret message via network quantum key distribution. In
quantum key distribution, it is usual to assume that Alice and Bob share secure random numbers whose
lengths are asymptotically negligible in block-length n because the asymptotically negligible keys are
needed for authentication for the public channel. In this case, to generate secure keys with length O(n),
we can employ Theorem 3, where the asymptotically negligible keys are used for an error verification
test.
For example, we consider the network given in Fig. 3, which has nodes v(1), . . . , v(8) as intermediates
nodes. Fig. 2 expresses the information on each edge in this network. This network connects Alice and
Bob with rank 4. The ranks of KE and HB of typical cases are summarized in Table II.
TABLE II
RANKS
Nodes rank KE rank HB
v(1) 1 2
v(2) 1 1
v(6) 2 1
v(2)&v(5) 2 2
v(2)&v(6) 2 1
v(1)&v(3) 2 4
v(1)&v(2) 2 3
v(1)&v(6) 2 2
v(1)&v(8) 3 3
v(6)&v(8) 4 2
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When the number of nodes occupied by Eve is limited to 1, the ranks of KE and HB are upper bounded
by 2. In the latter case, Theorem 3 guarantees that Alice can securely transmit a random number with
rank 2 per single use of the network. In the former case, since 4−2−2 = 0, Theorem 2 cannot guarantee
that Alice securely transmits her message to Bob.
As another example, we consider the network given in Fig. 6, in which, the nodes connect the next
nodes and the nodes after the next. Assume that we have pairs of secret keys in the network of Fig. 6.
We suppose that v(1) intends to communicate with v(8) securely. They make the network as v(1) →
v(12) → v(10) → v(8), v(1) → v(11) → v(9) → v(8), v(1) → v(3) → v(5) → v(7) → v(8),
v(1) → v(2) → v(4) → v(6) → v(8), which connects v(1) and v(8) with rank 4. When Eve occupies
one intermediate node, the ranks of KE and HB are one. In the latter case, Theorem 3 guarantees that
Alice in v(1) can securely transmit a random number with rank 3 per single use of the network. In the
former case, Theorem 2 guarantees that Alice in v(1) securely transmits her message to Bob with rank 2
per single use of the network.
v(1)
v(12)
v(11)
v(10)
v(9)
v(8) v(7)
v(6)
v(5)
v(4)
v(3)
v(2)
Fig. 6. Cyclic Network
When Eve occupies two intermediate nodes, the ranks of KE and HB are at most two. In the latter
case, Theorem 3 guarantees that Alice in v(1) can securely transmit a random number with rank 2 per
single use of the network. In the former case, Theorem 2 cannot guarantee that Alice in v(1) securely
transmits her message to Bob. This method can be generalized to the case when Alice and Bob are v(i)
and v(j) with |i− j| ≥ 2(mod 12).
Indeed, this idea can be generalized to the cyclic network even when the number of nodes is odd.
Further, this network can be generalized to the following network of quantum key distribution with
two integers k > l > 0. The set of nodes is given as {v(i)}ki=1, and the set of edges is given as
{(v(i), v(j))}|i−j|≤l( mod k). Now, we set Alice and Bob as v(i) and v(j) with |i− j| ≥ l(mod k). Then,
they can make 2l paths connecting v(i) and v(j) without duplication in the intermediate nodes. Then,
even when 2l− 1 nodes are occupied by Eve, Alice and Bob can securely share a secret random number
due to Theorem 3.
VI. APPLICATION TO MULTIPLE MULTICAST NETWORK
We consider how to apply our result to a multiple multicast network with a senders and
∑a
i=1 bi
receivers, in which, the senders and the receivers are labeled as i and (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ a and 1 ≤ j ≤ bi,
respectively. Sender i intends to securely sends the message to Receiver (i, j). That is, Sender i wants
to keep secrecy for Receiver (i′, j) with i′ 6= i. In the one-time use of the network, Sender i sends
m3,i symbols ~Xi of Fq via m3,i channels and Receiver (i, j) receives m4,i,j symbols ~Yi,jof Fq via m4,i,j
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channels. Without loss of generality, we can assume that m4,i,j does not depend on j and is simplified
to m4,i due to the following reason. When m4,i,j < maxj′ m4,i,j′ , we can consider that Receiver (i, j)
receives symbol 0 via maxj′ m4,i,j′ − m4,i,j channels. If the codes in network is designed perfectly, we
have no cross line nor no information leakage to unintended receivers. In this section, we consider the
case with small amount of cross line and information leakage to unintended receivers due to errors on
the design of network.
We assume that these senders and receivers are connected via network composed of linear operations.
Then, using matrices Ki,j;i′, we can describe their relations as
~Yi,j =
a∑
i′=1
Ki,j;i′ ~Xi′. (51)
While the senders transmit their information repeatedly, we assume that the coefficient matrices Ki,j;i′
do not change. We assume that receivers do not collude to recover the message from senders. Now, we
apply the model (2) to the secure communication transmission from Sender i to Receiver (i, j). When we
consider information leakage to Receiver (i′′, j′′) with i′′ 6= i, we substitute ~Xi, ( ~Xi′)i′ 6=i, ~Yi,j and ~Yi′′,j′′
into X , Z, YB, and YE, respectively. We assume that the rank of information crossed from other senders
is m1,i,j and the rank of leaked information to Receiver (i
′′, j′′) is m2,i;i′′,j′′ . We introduce the maximum
ranks m0,i := maxj rankKi,j;i, m1,i := maxj m1,i,j , and m2,i := maxi′′,j′′ m2,i;i′′,j′′. Sender i and Receiver
(i, j) are assumed to know only the integers m0,i, m1,i, m2,i, m3,i, m4,i and have no other knowledge for
the network structure. We choose our code by applying Theorem 4 to the case with m0 = m0,i, m1 = m1,i,
m2 = m2,i, m3 = m3,i, and m4 = m4,i. Since the code does not depend on the choice of j and i
′′, j′′,
this code works well in this situation.
VII. NON-LINEAR CODES IN ONE HOP RELAY NETWORK
A. Summary for non-linear codes in the one hop relay network given in Fig. 1
In this section, we focus on the imperfect security, i.e., the property that Eve cannot recover the original
message with probability one [19], [20]. It is known that there exists a linear imperfectly secure code over
a finite field Fq of sufficiently large prime power q when Eve may access a subset of channels that does
not contain a cut between Alice and Bob even when the linear code does not employ private randomness
in the intermediate nodes [56]. Theorem 1 guarantees that such a linear code is still imperfectly secure
even for active attack over the same network. However, it is not clear whether there exists such a linear
imperfectly secure code over a finite field Fp of a prime p. To see how crucial the linearity condition
is in Theorem 1, we consider this problem over the one hop relay network given in Fig. 1 with edges
E = {e(1), e(2), e(3), e(4)} only in the single shot setting, i.e., the case when the integer n defined in
Section VII-B2 is 1, in other words, the sender sends only one element of Zd, which is called the scalar
linearity when Zd is a finite field Fp with prime p [58, Section I]
3. That is, we consider the transmission
of the message M in Zd by using the one hop relay network given in Fig. 1 when the information at
the edges is given as an element of Zd. Here, d is an arbitrary natural number, and it is not necessarily
a prime number. In contrast, Theorem 1 holds with an arbitrary n, which is called the vector linearity
when Zd is a finite field Fp with prime p. Also, private randomness is allowed in the sender, but no
private randomness is allowed in the intermediate nodes. Therefore, we are allowed to choose an arbitrary
deterministic function ϕ from Z2d to Z
2
d as our coding operation on the intermediate node. Our encoder in
the source node is given as a stochastic map φ from Zd to Z
2
d, and our decoder is given as a deterministic
function ψ from Z2d to Zd. Eve is allowed to attack two edges of E except for the pairs {e(1), e(2)} and
{e(3), e(4)}. In this section, we call the triplet (φ, ϕ, ψ) a code over the one hop relay network (Fig. 1).
3In contrast, the linear setting is called the vector linearity when the integer n defined in Section VII-B2 is greater than 1. In fact, the paper
[56] discussed this kind of imperfectly secure code in the case with n = 1 while it chooses large q. In contrast, the paper [42] discussed
a similar imperfectly secure code construction by increasing n (the vector linearity) while it did not increase the size of q. The paper [59]
extended this type of vector linearity setting of imperfectly secure codes to the case with multi-source multicast.
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We have two attack models, the passive attack and the active attack. In the passive attack, Eve can
eavesdrop two edges, but cannot change the information on the attacked edge. In the active attack, Eve
can insert another information on the attacked edge in the first group {e(1), e(2)}, and eavesdrop one
edge in the second group {e(3), e(4)}. That is, we consider the active attack with EA = EE . Here, Eve
cannot change the edge to be attacked by using the information on the attacked edge in the first group
{e(1), e(2)}. When a code satisfies the following two conditions in the respective models, the code is
called imperfectly secure in the respective models. Otherwise, it is called insecure in the respective models.
In the following conditions, the information on the edge e(i) is written as Yi.
(B1) (Recoverability) Bob can recover the message M from Y3 and Y4 when Eve does not make any
replacement.
(B2) (Secrecy) No active attack ψ˜ from Z3d to Zd satisfies one of the following conditions.
ψ˜(Y1, Y
′
1 , Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y1, Y
′
1 , Y4) = M, (52)
ψ˜(Y2, Y
′
2 , Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y2, Y
′
2 , Y4) = M, (53)
where Y ′1 and Y
′
2 are the information replaced by Eve at the edges e(1) and e(2), and Y3 and Y4
are the information at the edges e(3) and e(4). This kind of secrecy is called imperfect security
[19], [20].
Under the above formulation, we compare the case of linear codes with the case of non-linear codes.
Since the message is an element of Zd, the linearity in this problem can be regarded as scalar linearity
when d is a prime number. We have the following three theorems.
Theorem 4. There is no secure linear code even for passive attack when d is a prime p.
Proof: Due to the linearity of our code, we can choose a 2 × 2 matrix A on Fp such that the relations
Y3 = A1,1Y1 + A1,2Y2 and Y4 = A2,1Y1 + A2,2Y2 holds when there is no attack. When the rank of A is
1, the information of Y3 is the same as that of Y4. When Eve eavesdrops Y3, Eve obtains all information
that the receiver gets. Then, Eve recovers the message if the receiver recovers the message.
Next, we assume that the rank of A is 2. The vector (A1,1, A1,2) is linearly independent of at least one
of (1, 0) and (0, 1). Assume that it is linearly independent of (1, 0), for simplicity. When Eve eavesdrops
e(3) and e(1), Eve can recover the information Y4 from Y3 and Y1. Hence, Eve obtains all information
that the receiver gets.
Theorem 5. When d = 2, there exists a imperfectly secure linear code for passive attack, but there exists
no imperfectly secure linear code for active attack.
Since we are allowed to use arbitrary matrices K and H in Theorem 1 of the single shot setting, the
security of active attack in the linear codes can be reduced to the security of passive attack in the linear
codes. Notice that Theorem 1 can be extended to the case when Fq is replaced by Zd. Theorem 5 shows
the existence of the non-linear code whose security for active attack cannot be reduced to the security for
passive attack. Hence, such a non-linear code can be regarded as a counterexample of Theorem 1 without
the linearity condition.
Theorem 6. When d ≥ 3, there exists a imperfectly secure linear code even for active attack.
As a summary, we have Table III, which shows the importance of non-linear codes in the prime case.
In fact, this analysis depends on the property of single shot case, i.e., the case with n = 1. The next paper
[52] discusses the analysis with n > 1, which contains the vector linearity.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY FOR ONE HOP RELAY NETWORK (FIG. 1) WITH SINGLE SHOT SETTING
Code passive attack active attack
linear code when d is prime insecure insecure
linear code over Fq with
imperfectly secure imperfectly secure
sufficiently large prime power
non-linear code with d = 2 imperfectly secure insecure
non-linear code with d ≥ 3 imperfectly secure imperfectly secure
B. Analysis with d = 2
1) Counterexample of Theorem 1 without the linearity condition: First, to show Theorem 5, we give a
special example of our code, in which, the intermediate node performs a non-linear operation as
Y3 := Y1(Y2 + Y1) = Y1(Y2 + 1), (54)
Y4 := (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + Y1) = (Y1 + 1)Y2. (55)
To send the binary information M ∈ F2, we prepare the binary uniform scramble random variable
L ∈ F2. We consider the following code. The encoder φ is given as
Y1 := L, Y2 := M + L. (56)
The decoder ψ is given as ψ(Y3, Y4) := Y3 + Y4. Since Y3 and Y4 are given as follows under this code;
Y3 = LM, Y4 = LM +M, (57)
the decoder can recover M whatever the value of L.
Now, we consider the leaked information for the passive attack. As shown in Appendix B, the mutual
information and the l1 norm security measure of these cases are calculated as
I(M ; Y1, Y3) = I(M ; Y1, Y4)
=I(M ; Y2, Y3) = I(M ; Y2, Y4) =
1
2
, (58)
d1(M |Y1, Y3) = d1(M |Y1, Y4)
=d1(M |Y2, Y3) = d1(M |Y2, Y4) = 1
2
, (59)
where the l1 norm security measure d1(X|Y ) is defined as d1(X|Y ) :=
∑
y
∑
x | 1|X |PY (y) − PXY (xy)|
by using the cardinality |X | of the set of outcomes of the variable X . In this subsection, we choose 2 as
the base of the logarithm.
(i) When EA = EE = {e(1), e(3)}, Eve replaces Y1 by 1. Then, I(M ; Y1, Y3) = 1 because Y3 +
Y1 + 1 = M .
(ii) When EA = EE = {e(1), e(4)}, Eve replaces Y1 by 0. Then, I(M ; Y1, Y4) = 1 because Y4+Y1 =
M .
(iii) When EA = EE = {e(2), e(3)} or {e(2), e(4)}, Eve has no advantageous active attack.
When Eve is allowed to use the above passive attack, (58) shows that the code is secure in the sense
of (B1). Therefore, we obtain the first part of Theorem 5. Since this code is insecure under the above
active attack, this example is a counterexample of Theorem 1 without linearity.
Remark 9. As another encoder, we can consider
Y1 := M + L, Y2 := L. (60)
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Replacing M + L by L, the analysis can be reduced to the presented analysis. When the message M
is not leaked to e(1) or e(2) and M can be recovered, the code is essentially the same as our code as
follows.
Assume that the information Y2 on e(2) is independent of M . Then, we denote it by L. In order that
Y1 is independent and M can be recovered from Y1 and L, Y1 needs to be M + L or M + L+ 1.
In this model, Eve can completely contaminate the messageM . When Eve takes choice (i), and replaces
Y3 by Y3+1, Bob’s decoded message is M+1. Under choice (ii), Eve can totally contaminate the message
M in a similar way.
2) Uniqueness of network code given in (54) and (55): The previous subsubsection provided an example
where Eve’s active attack improves her performance. To show the second part of Theorem 5, we need to
show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that a code (φ, ϕ, ψ) satisfies the following conditions. Let Y1 and Y2 be the random
variable generated by the encoder φ when M is subject to the uniform distribution. We assume that the
random variables (Y3, Y4) := ϕ(Y1, Y2) satisfies the following conditions.
(C1) The relation ψ(Y3, Y4) = M holds.
(C2) There is no deterministic function ψ˜ from F22 to F2 satisfying one of the following conditions.
ψ˜(Y1, Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y1, Y4) = M, (61)
ψ˜(Y2, Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y2, Y4) = M. (62)
Then, there exist functions f1, f2, f3, f4 on F2 such that Y
′
i := fi(Yi) is given in (54), (55), and (56) with
a scramble random variable L while the variable L might be correlated with M .
Since the number of edges to be attacked is the same as the transmission rate from Alice to Bob,
no linear code works in this scheme. Hence, we need to introduce a non-linear coding operation in the
intermediate node. Lemma 2 shows that such a non-linear coding operation is limited to (54) and (55).
The combination of Lemma 2 and the discussion in Section VII implies that there is no code over
the one hop relay network (Fig. 1) to guarantee the secrecy for an active attack. However, this theorem
assumes a deterministic coding operation on the intermediate node. If we are allowed to use a randomized
operation on the intermediate node in a similar way to an encoder, we can construct a code whose secrecy
holds even against Eve’s active attack in this situation as follows. In the first step, we employ the code
given in (56). Using another scramble random variable L′, the intermediate node performs the following
coding operation:
Y3 := Y1 + Y2 + L
′ = M ′L, Y4 := L
′. (63)
Then, Eve cannot recover the message M from (Y1, Y3), (Y1, Y4), (Y2, Y3), nor (Y2, Y4). This example
shows that the deterministic condition for ϕ is crucial in Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Step (1): To satisfy condition (C1), we need to recover the messageM from (Y1, Y2) from a deterministic
function f . Functions from F22 to F2 are classified as follows.
Y1, Y1 + 1, Y2, Y2 + 1, 0, 1 (64)
Y1 + Y2, Y1 + Y2 + 1, (65)
Y1Y2, (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1), (Y1 + 1)Y2, Y1(Y2 + 1), (66)
Y1Y2 + 1, (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1) + 1, (Y1 + 1)Y2 + 1, Y1(Y2 + 1) + 1. (67)
The cases in (64) are non-secure or does not satisfy (C1). The cases in (65) are reduced to the case
M = Y1 + Y2. The cases in (66) and (67) are reduced to the case M = Y1Y2. Hence, we consider only
these two cases.
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Step (2): Now, we consider the case M = Y1+Y2. When Y3 or Y4 is given as a non-zero linear function
of Y1 and Y2, we denote the random variable as Y∗. Hence, Y1 or Y2 is linearly independent of Y∗. We
denote the linearly independent variable as Y∗∗. When Eve eavesdrops Y∗ and Y∗∗, she can recover Y1
and Y2 and so she can also recover M . To satisfy condition (C2), we need to avoid such an attack, which
requires both Y3 and Y4 to be non-linear functions of (Y1, Y2). They are given as two of the functions
given in (66) and (67). Since any function in (67) is deterministically given from a function given in (66),
we consider only functions in (66). Under this constraint, if and only if (Y3, Y4) are given as the pair
(Y1Y2, (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1)) or (Y1(Y2 + 1), (Y1 + 1)Y2), we can recover M = Y1 + Y2 from Y3 and Y4. The
latter case is the same as (54) and (55). In the former case, we obtain (54) and (55) by replacing Y2 by
Y2 + 1.
Step (3): Now, we consider the case where M = Y1Y2. For the same reason as with Step (2), condition
(C2) requires both Y3 and Y4 to be non-linear functions of (Y1, Y2). Thus, we consider only functions
in (66). For secrecy, i.e., to satisfy (C2), we cannot use Y1Y2. Hence, we need to choose two from
(Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1), (Y1 + 1)Y2, and Y1(Y2 + 1). However, no two of them can recover M . To observe this
fact, we consider cases with (Y1 + 1)Y2 and Y1(Y2 + 1). In these cases, when (Y1, Y2) = (0, 0) or (1, 1),
both values are zero. That is, we cannot distinguish (0, 0) and (1, 1). Hence, we cannot recover M from
(Y1 +1)Y2 and Y1(Y2 + 1), i.e., condition (C1) does not hold. We can show this fact in other pairs in the
same way. Therefore, there is no operation satisfying the required conditions when M = Y1Y2.
C. Analysis with d ≥ 3
1) Construction of imperfectly secure code for active attacks: To show Theorem 6, we construct a
secure network coding against any active attack on the one hop relay network given in Fig. 1 when
the message and the information at the edges are given as an element of Zd. Here, we define our code
(φ, ϕ, ψ) in the same way as in Subsection VII-B2. That is, the coding operation ϕ on the intermediate
node has no additional scramble random variable.
It show Theorem 6, it is sufficient to construct a code to satisfy the conditions (B1) and (B2) given
in Subsection VII-A. Since it is not so easy to check the conditions (B1) and (B2), we seek equivalent
conditions. For simplicity, we employ a scramble variable L taking values in Zd. Hence, we assume that
the encoder φ in the source node is given as a pair of functions (φ(1), φ(2)) that maps two random variables
(M,L) to the two variables (Y1, Y2). That is, the encoder φ forms a function from Z
2
d to itself. Now, we
fix the function φ as follows
Y1 = φ
(1)(M,L) := M + L, Y2 = φ
(2)(M,L) := L. (68)
For a coding operation ϕ, we define the functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) as
(ϕ(3)(i, j), ϕ(4)(i, j)) := ϕ(i, j). (69)
Then, we regard the functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) as matrices as follows,
ϕ
(3)
i,j := ϕ
(3)(i, j), ϕ
(4)
i,j := ϕ
(4)(i, j). (70)
To discuss condition (B2), we introduce an anti-Latin square. A matrix ai,j on Zd is called an anti-Latin
square when each row and each column have duplicate elements as
 1 0 00 0 2
1 2 2

 ,

 1 0 11 2 1
0 2 0

 , (71)


1 0 3 3
0 0 2 3
1 1 3 2
0 2 2 1

 ,


2 2 1 0
0 3 3 1
0 3 3 0
1 1 2 2

 , (72)
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which is the opposite requirement to a Latin square. Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. When the encoder φ satisfies condition (68), conditions (B1) and (B2) are rewritten as
(B1’) For each a ∈ Zd and m 6= m′ ∈ Zd, the relation Ξa,m(ϕ(3), ϕ(4)) ∩ Ξa,m′(ϕ(3), ϕ(4)) = ∅ holds,
where Ξa,m(ϕ
(3), ϕ(4)) := ϕ(4)({(i, i+m)|ϕ(3)i,i+m = a}).
(B2’) The matrices ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) are anti-Latin squares.
Proof: We have the equivalence between conditions (B1) and (B1’) because (B1’) means that the pair of
ϕ(3)(i, j) and ϕ(4)(i, j) uniquely identifies the difference m = j − i.
Next, we show the equivalence between (B2) and (B2’). Assume that Eve eavesdrops and contaminates
Y1 and eavesdrops Y3. Choosing the replaced information Y
′
1 , Eve can choose a row of the matrix ϕ
(3). To
prevent Eve from recovering M perfectly, all the rows of the matrix ϕ(3) need to have duplicate elements.
Hence, to satisfy condition (B2), both matrices ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) need to satisfy this duplication requirement
for all rows and columns.
Due to Lemma 3, to show Theorem 6, it is sufficient to construct a pair of anti-Latin squares to satisfy
conditions (B1’) and (B2’). While it is trivial to find anti-Latin squares, they need to satisfy condition
(B1’) as well. Condition (B2’) forbids a linear operation on the intermediate node in the finite field case.
A pair of anti-Latin squares is called decodable when it satisfies condition (B1’). That is, a decodable
pair of anti-Latin squares gives a code on the one hop relay network given in Fig. 1 satisfying conditions
(B1) and (B2). Lemma 2 says that there is no decodable pair of 2× 2 anti-Latin squares. Fortunately, Eq.
(71) (Eq. (72)) is a decodable pair of 3× 3 (4× 4) anti-Latin squares.
However, we can systematically construct decodable pairs of anti-Latin squares. The following are pairs
of anti-Latin squares for d = 3, 5, 7:
 0 1 01 1 2
0 2 2

 ,

 0 2 20 1 0
1 1 2

 , (73)


0 1 2 0 0
1 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 3 4
0 3 3 3 4
0 1 4 4 4

 ,


0 3 3 3 4
0 1 4 4 4
0 1 2 0 0
1 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 3 4

 , (74)


0 1 2 3 0 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 1 1
2 2 2 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 3 4 5 6
0 4 4 4 4 5 6
0 1 5 5 5 5 6
0 1 2 6 6 6 6


,


0 4 4 4 4 5 6
0 1 5 5 5 5 6
0 1 2 6 6 6 6
0 1 2 3 0 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 1 1
2 2 2 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 3 4 5 6


. (75)
These constructions are generalized to the case with a general odd number d = 2ℓ + 1 as follows. The
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functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) are defined as
(ϕ(3))−1(k) :=


(k, k − ℓ), (k, k − ℓ+ 1), . . . ,
(k, k − 1), (k, k), (k − 1, k), . . . ,
(k − ℓ+ 1, k), (k − ℓ, k)

 (76)
(ϕ(4))−1(k) :=


(k + ℓ, k − ℓ), (k + ℓ, k − ℓ+ 1),
. . . , (k + ℓ, k − 1),
(k + ℓ, k), (k + ℓ− 1, k),
. . . , (k + 1, k), (k, k)


. (77)
Then, we have
ϕ(4)(k, k − ℓ) = k − ℓ, (78)
ϕ(4)(k, k − ℓ+ 1) = k − ℓ+ 1, (79)
... (80)
ϕ(4)(k, k − 1) = k − 1 (81)
ϕ(4)(k, k) = k (82)
ϕ(4)(k − 1, k) = k + ℓ (83)
... (84)
ϕ(4)(k − ℓ+ 1, k) = k + 2 (85)
ϕ(4)(k − ℓ, k) = k + 1, (86)
which satisfy condition (B1’). Hence, the functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) give a pair of anti-Latin squares.
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Next, we consider the even case with d ≥ 4. The following are pairs of anti-Latin squares for d = 4, 6, 8:

0 1 3 3
0 1 2 0
1 1 2 3
0 2 2 3

 ,


0 0 1 0
1 1 1 2
3 2 2 2
3 0 3 3

 , (87)


0 1 2 5 5 5
0 1 2 3 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 1
2 2 2 3 4 5
0 3 3 3 4 5
0 1 4 4 4 5


,


1 1 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 2 3 4
5 3 3 3 3 4
5 0 4 4 4 4
5 0 1 5 5 5
0 0 1 2 0 0


, (88)


0 1 2 3 7 7 7 7
0 1 2 3 4 0 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 1
2 2 2 3 4 5 6 2
3 3 3 3 4 5 6 7
0 4 4 4 4 5 6 7
0 1 5 5 5 5 6 7
0 1 2 6 6 6 6 7


,


2 2 2 2 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6
7 4 4 4 4 4 5 6
7 0 5 5 5 5 5 6
7 0 1 6 6 6 6 6
7 0 1 2 7 7 7 7
0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0
1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1


. (89)
These constructions are generalized to the case with a general even number d = 2ℓ with ℓ ≥ 2 as follows.
The functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) are defined as
(ϕ(3))−1(k) :=


(k + 1, k − ℓ+ 1),
(k + 1, k − ℓ+ 2), . . . ,
(k + 1, k − 1), (k + 1, k),
(k, k), (k − 1, k), . . . ,
(k − ℓ+ 2, k), (k − ℓ+ 1, k)


(90)
(ϕ(4))−1(k) :=


(k − ℓ+ 1, k − ℓ+ 2),
(k − ℓ+ 2, k − ℓ+ 2), . . . ,
(k, k − ℓ+ 2),
(k + 1, k − ℓ+ 2),
(k + 1, k − ℓ+ 1), . . . ,
(k + 1, k − 2ℓ+ 4),
(k + 1, k − 2ℓ+ 3)


. (91)
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Then, we have
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k − ℓ+ 1) = k + ℓ, (92)
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k − ℓ+ 2) = k + ℓ+ 1, (93)
... (94)
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k − 1) = k + 2ℓ− 2 (95)
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k) = k + ℓ− 1 (96)
ϕ(4)(k, k) = k + ℓ− 2 (97)
ϕ(4)(k − 1, k) = k + ℓ− 3 (98)
... (99)
ϕ(4)(k − ℓ+ 2, k) = k (100)
ϕ(4)(k − ℓ+ 1, k) = k − 1, (101)
which satisfy condition (B1’). Hence, the functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) give a pair of anti-Latin squares.
In summary, since these examples work with d ≥ 3, we have proven Theorem 6, i.e., there exists a
secure code over the active attacks on the one hop relay network (Fig. 1) when d ≥ 3.
Furthermore, when ϕ is given by these pairs of anti-Latin squares, Bob can decode L as well as M
while the code given by (71) nor (72) cannot. That is, these systematic constructions work well whenever
the encoder φ = (φ(1), φ(2)) is a one-to-one function on Z2d to satisfy the condition {i|∃j, φ(1)(i, j) =
k} = {i|∃j, φ(2)(i, j) = k} = Zd for any k.
2) Leaked information of our code for passive attacks: Next, we discuss the leaked information under
the above code under passive attacks in a way similar to (58) and (59).
Since for i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4, the pair M,Yi decides Y1, Y2, we have H(Yj|MYi) = 0. Since Yi is
independent of M , we have
I(M ; YiYj) = H(M)−H(M |YiYj)
=H(M |Yi)−H(M |YiYj) = I(M ; Yj |Yi)
=H(Yj|Yi)−H(Yj|MYi) = H(Yj|Yi). (102)
When d is odd, we have
H(Yj|Yi) = H(Yj|Yi = yi)
=
d+ 1
2
· 1
d
log
2d
d+ 1
+
d− 1
2
· 1
d
log d (103)
for any yi with i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4.
When d ≥ 4 and d is even, we have
H(Y3|Y2) = H(Y3|Y2 = y2) = H(Y4|Y1) = H(Y4|Y1 = y1)
=
d+ 2
2
· 1
d
log
2d
d+ 2
+
d− 2
2
· 1
d
log d (104)
H(Y3|Y1) = H(Y3|Y1 = y1) = H(Y4|Y2) = H(Y4|Y2 = y2)
=
1
2
log 2 +
1
2
log d (105)
for any y1, y2. In summary, when d is large, we have
I(M ; YiYj) =
1
2
log d+
1
2
log 2 +O(
log d
d
). (106)
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3) Lower bound of leaked information for passive attacks: Next, to show the optimality of the code
defined in Subsubsection VII-C1, we show that the amount in (106) is close to the minimum leaked
information under a certain condition when d is large. To derive a lower bound, we consider the following
conditions for our code.
(D1) The coding operation on the intermediate node is deterministic.
(D2) Alice can use a scramble random variable L.
Since our encoder is given as a stochastic map φ from Z2 to Z
2
2 in Subsection VII-A, condition (D2) is
a more restrictive condition for our encoder. Then, we have the following theorem.
Lemma 4. Any network code satisfies the inequality
I(M ; YiY3) + I(M ; YiY4) ≥ 2H(M)− log d. (107)
for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 4 shows that
max
i,j
I(M ; YiYj) ≥ H(M)− 1
2
log d, (108)
where the maximum is chosen from i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4. That is, to realize maxi,j I(M ; YiYj) = 0, the
message M needs to satisfy
H(M) ≤ 1
2
log d. (109)
When M is the uniform random variable, (108) can be rewritten as
max
i,j
I(M ; YiYj) ≥ 1
2
log d. (110)
This lower bound is almost equal to the RHS of (106) when d is large.
Proof:
Since M is decoded by Y3Y4,
H(M |YiY3) ≤ H(Y3Y4|YiY3) = H(Y4|YiY3) ≤ H(Y4|Yi).
Similarly, we have H(M |YiY4) ≤ H(Y3|YiY4) by replacing Y3 and Y4. Let i′ be the integer 1 or 2 that is
different from i. Combining them, we have
H(M |YiY3) +H(M |YiY4) ≤ H(Y4|Yi) +H(Y3|YiY4)
=H(Y3Y4|Yi)
(a)
≤ H(YiYi′|Yi)
=H(Yi′|Yi) ≤ log d,
where (a) follows from the fact that Y3Y4 is decided by Y1Y2. Thus, we obtain
I(M ; YiY3) + I(M ; YiY4)
=2H(M)− (H(M |YiY3) +H(M |YiY4))
≥2H(M)− log d.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed how sequential error injection affects the information leaked to Eve. As the result, we
have shown that there is no improvement when the network is composed of linear operations. However,
when the network contains non-linear operations, we have found a counterexample that improves the
information obtained by Eve. Moreover, as Theorem 2, we have shown the achievability of the asymptotic
rate m0−m1−m2 for a linear network under the secrecy and robustness conditions when the transmission
rate from Alice to Bob is m0, the rate of noise injected by Eve is m1, and the rate of information leakage
to Eve is m2. The converse part of this rate is an interesting open problem. In addition, as Theorem 3,
we have discussed the secrecy and the asymptotic transmission rate when Eve has a possibility to inject
noise into the network.
We have also discussed security over such active attacks on codes with a non-linear operation on the
intermediate node in the one hop relay network (Fig. 1). In the binary case, when we impose our code to a
certain security condition without an active attack, as shown in Section VII-B2, our code is limited to the
non-linear code given in Section VII. Unfortunately, the non-linear code given in Section VII is insecure
under active attacks. To meet this kind of security condition, the coding operation on the intermediate
node needs to be non-linear. To characterize this kind of security, we have introduced a new concept an
“anti-Latin square”, which is an opposite concept to a Latin square. That is, such a secure code can be
given as a decodable pair of anti-Latin squares while the concept of “decodable” is also introduced in
Section VII-C. We have also shown the existence of a decodable pair of d × d anti-Latin squares when
d ≥ 3. This fact shows that there exists a secure code over active attacks in the sense described in Section
VII except for the binary case.
Further, we have applied our results to network quantum key distribution. Then, we have clarified
what type of network will enable us to realize secure long distance communication based on short
distance quantum key distribution. However, when we consider only the case given in Fig. 6, we can
employ a classical (non-quantum) secret sharing protocol [30] instead of network coding because all of
communications of this case are routing. In particular, cheater-identifiable secret sharing against rushing
cheaters [31], [32], [33], [34], [35] enables us to share secure keys without using public channels or prior
shared randomness.
In this way, this paper has discussed the application of secure network coding to a network model whose
communications on the edges are realized by quantum key distribution. Replacing the role of quantum
key distribution by physical layer security, we can consider a secure network based on physical layer
security. In particular, we can use secure wireless communication [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50] as
a typical form of physical layer security, which provides us with a secure network based on secure wireless
communication. A crucial weak point of physical layer security is the possibility that the eavesdropper
might break the assumption of the model. Such an attack might be realized in the following cases. (1)
The eavesdropper concentrates his/her resources on one point. (2) The eavesdropper luckily encounters
a situation that the assumption is broken. When we combine physical layer security and secure network
coding in the above way, to eavesdrop our information, the eavesdropper needs to break the model of
physical layer security in multiple communication channels. In case (1), to realize this condition, the
eavesdropper has to distribute his/her resources, which increases the difficulty of eavesdropping. For case
(2), the eavesdropper must be lucky in multiple communication channels, and this probability is very
small. In this way, this kind of combination is particularly useful.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To show Proposition 1, we regard any element of the finite field Fq as an element of a t-dimensional
algebraic extension Fq′ of the finite field Fq, where q
′ = qt. The matrices KB, HB, KE, HE on Fq can be
regarded as matrices on Fq′ . By choosing ln := tn, the matrices X
ln , Y lnB , Y
ln
E , Z
ln on Fq are converted
to matrices X ′n, Y ′B
n
, Y ′E
n
, Z ′n on Fq′ , which also satisfy (23) and (24) by regarding the same matrices
KB, HB, KE, HE on Fq as matrices on Fq′ . Then, the following proposition is known.
Proposition 4 ([14], [12], [13], [15]). We assume the following two conditions for m2, m1, m0 and a
sequence of prime power q′n. The inequality m2 +m1 < m0 holds. The size q
′
n of the finite field increases
such that
q′n
nm0+1
→ ∞. Then, there exists a sequence of codes Φn of block-length n on finite field Fq′n
whose message set is F
k′n
q′n
such that
lim
n→∞
k′n
n
= m0 −m1 (111)
lim
n→∞
max
K,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H , α
n] = 0, (112)
where the maximum is taken in the same way as with Proposition 1.
The optimality of the rate m0 −m1 was also shown under the condition (112) in [15, Sections VI &
VII]. By choosing tn = ⌈ (m0+1) lognlog q ⌉ and ln := tnn, Proposition 4 implies Proposition 1. Hence, we need
to explain how to show Proposition 4.
Combining the results in [14], [12], [13], [15], we can construct a sequence of codes to satisfy (111) and
(112). More precisely, the papers [12, Section IX][13, Section VIII] constructed a sequence of codes to
satisfy (111) and (112) under the condition m2+2m1 < m0. This is because the condition m2+2m1 < m0
is stronger than the condition m2 +m1 < m0, which is the assumption of Proposition 4. To show (112)
under the weaker condition m2 +m1 < m0, the papers by Jaggi, Langberg, Katti, Ho, Katabi, Me´dard,
and Effros [12, Section VII][13, Section VI][15, Section IV-C] constructed a sequence of codes to satisfy
(111) and (112), when Alice can send Bob secret information whose size is asymptotically negligible in
comparison with n, in the following way.
Proposition 5 ([14], [12], [13]). We assume the following three conditions. The inequality m0 > m1
holds. Alice can send Bob secret information whose size is asymptotically negligible in comparison with
n. The size q′n of the finite field increases such that
q′n
nm0+1
→ ∞. Then, there exists a sequence of codes
Φn of block-length n on finite field Fq′n whose message set is F
k′n
q′n
such that the relations (112) and (111)
hold.
Then, under the weaker condition m2+m1 < m0, as the following proposition, the papers [14, Section
III][15, Section V] provide a protocol for secure transmission of random variables with an asymptotically
negligible length kn in comparison with n, which is the requirement in Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 ([14, Section III],[15, Section V]). We assume the inequality m2 +m1 < m0. Then, there
exists a sequence of codes Φn of block-length n whose message set is F
kn
q such that
lim
n→∞
kn =∞ (113)
lim
n→∞
max
K,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H , α
n] = 0, (114)
lim
n→∞
max
K,H
I(M ; Y nE )[Φn,K,H , 0] = 0, (115)
where the maximum is taken in the same way as Proposition 4.
Therefore, attaching the protocol of Proposition 6 to the codes given in Proposition 5, we obtain (112)
under the weaker condition m2 +m1 < m0. However, their proof of Proposition 5 is very hard to read
because it omits the detail derivation. In the following, we give an alternative proof of Proposition 5.
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Before our proof of Proposition 5, we prepare two lemmas. The first lemma can be easily shown by
the discussion of linear algebra. In the following discussion, we simplify q′n to q
′.
Lemma 5. For integers a0 ≤ a1 + a2, a′1, a′2, we fix an a1-dimensional subspace W1 ⊂ Fa
′
1
q′ and an
a2-dimensional subspace W2 ⊂ Fa
′
2
q′ . We assume the following two conditions.
(E1) An a0 × a′1 matrix A1 and an a0 × a′2 matrix A2 satisfy
KerA1|W1 = {0}, (116)
ImA1 ∩ ImA2 = {0}, (117)
where Im(f) denotes the image of the function f .
(E2) We consider a subspace W3 ⊂W1⊕W2. For vectors x1, . . . , xb ∈ W1 and y1, . . . , yb ∈ W2 with
b ≥ a1 + a2, (x1, y1), . . . , (xb, yb) span W3.
Then, we have the following statements.
(E3) There exists an a′1 × a0 matrix A3 such that A3(A1xi + A2yi) = xi for i = 1, . . . , b, i.e.,
A3 [A1 A2]
[
x1 x2 · · · xb
y1 y2 · · · yb
]
=
[
x1 x2 · · · xb
]
. (118)
(E4) The above matrix A3 satisfies the relation
A3(A1x+ A2y) = x (119)
for any (x, y) ∈ W3.
Proof: Due to condition (E1), we choose a map A4 from ImA1 to W1 such that A4A1 is the identify on
W1. Since W1 is included in F
a′1
q′ , A4 can be regarded as a map from ImA1 to F
a′1
q′ . Then, we choose a
projection A5 from F
a0
q′ to ImA1 such that A5x = 0 for x ∈ ImA2. Therefore, A3 := A5A4 satisfies the
condition of (E3). Further, (E2) guarantees (E4).
Lemma 6 ([12, Section VII][13, Claim 5]). We independently choose m random variables V1, . . . , Vm
subject to the uniform distribution on Fq′ . We define the n×m matrix U1 as U1;i,j := (Vj)i with i = 1, . . . , n
and j = 1, . . . , m. Then,
Pr{xU1 = x′U1} ≤
(n
q′
)m
(120)
for any x 6= x′ ∈ Fnq′ .
Proof of Proposition 5:
Step (1): Code construction
First, we provide our code when we use the channel n times based on the finite field Fq′ . Our message
is given as an (m0 −m1) × n matrix M , which satisfies condition (111) asymptotically. Since the rank
of HB is m1, there exist a m4 ×m1 matrix HˆB and m1 × n matrix Zˆn such that
Y nB = KBU0X
n +HBZ
n = KBU0X
n + HˆBZˆ
n. (121)
Then, we address HˆB and Zˆ
n instead of HB and Z
n.
We fix an integer m := m0 + 1. We independently choose m random variables V1, . . . , Vm subject to
the uniform distribution on Fq′ . Also, we randomly choose the m3 ×m3 matrix U0 among all m3 ×m3
invertible matrices.
Then, we define the n ×m matrix U1 as U1;i,j := (Vj)i with i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m. We also
define the (m0 −m1) ×m matrix U2 := MU1. Moreover, we define the m3 × n matrix Xn :=
[
M
0
]
,
where 0 is the m1 × n zero matrix. As secret information with a negligible rate, Alice sends Bob the
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information V1, . . . , Vm, U2. Then, Alice inputs the m3 × n matrix U0Xn as the input of n times use of
the channel.
Then, Bob receives them4×n matrix Y nB given in (121) as well as the secret information V1, . . . , Vm, U2.
Since the ranks of KBU0X
n and HˆB are m0 −m1 and m1 at most, respectively, the rank of the matrix
Y nB is m0 at most. We denote the rank by m¯0. We choose m¯0 linearly independent row vectors from the
row vectors of Y nB . We denote the m¯0 × n matrix composed of the m¯0 independent row vectors by Y¯ nB .
Similarly, we denote the matrices composed of these m¯0 row vectors of the matrices KB and HˆB by K¯B
and H¯B , respectively. Then, using the standard Gaussian elimination, Bob finds a matrix U3 to satisfy the
equation
U3Y¯
n
BU1 = U2, (122)
which is equivalent to
U3
[
K¯BU0Pm0−m1 H¯B
] [ M
Zˆn
]
U1 = MU1, (123)
where Pm0−m1 is the imbedding
[
I
0
]
from Fm0−m1q′ to F
m3
q′ . Notice that Bob can calculate U1 from the
secret information V1, . . . , Vm. Finally, Bob recovers the information Mˆ := U3Y¯
n
B . To check the condition
(122), Bob needs only Y¯ nB , U2, and U1, which can be computed from V1, . . . , Vm.
Step (2): Analysis of performance
There are two conditions if the above protocol is to work well.
(F1) The relations Im(K¯BU0Pm0−m1) ∩ Im H¯B = {0} and Ker K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} hold.
(F2) The relation rank
[
M
Zˆn
]
U1 = rank
[
M
Zˆn
]
holds, where rank denotes the rank of the matrix.
Assume that conditions (F1) and (F2) hold. We apply Lemma 5 to the case when a0 = m¯0, a1 =
rankM, a2 = rank Zˆ
n,W1 = ImM,W2 = Im Zˆ
n, A1 = K¯BU0Pm0−m1 , A2 = H¯B, A3 = U3. Then,
conditions (F1) and (F2) guarantee conditions (E1) and (E2), respectively. Then, due to condition (E3),
there exists a matrix U3 that satisfies equation (122), i.e., (123). Condition (E4) guarantees that U3Y¯
n
B = M ,
i.e., Bob can decode the message M .
Now, we evaluate the probability that condition (F2) holds. Condition (F2) holds if and only if
zT
[
M
Zˆn
]
U1 6= 0 for any z ∈ Fm0q′ satisfying the condition zT
[
M
Zˆn
]
6= 0. Applying Lemma 6 to all of
z( 6= 0) ∈ Fm0q′ , we find that condition (F2) holds at least with probability 1− q′m0( nq′ )m = 1 − n
m
q′m−m0
=
1− nm0+1
q′
→ 1.
Finally, we evaluate the probability that condition (F1) holds. As shown later, the following conditions
(F1’) and (F1”) imply condition (F1).
(F1’) The relation Im(KBU0Pm0−m1) ∩ Im HˆB = {0} holds.
(F1”) The relation KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} holds.
Hence, we show that conditions (F1’) and (F1”) hold with a probability close to 1. Condition Im(KBU0Pm0−m1)∩
Im HˆB = {0} holds if and only if ImU0Pm0−m1 ∩ K−1B (Im HˆB) = {0}. For a fixed KB, HˆB, since
dimK−1B (Im HˆB) ≤ m3 −m0 +m1, the probability of condition Im(KBU0Pm0−m1)∩ Im HˆB = {0} is at
least
(1− q′m3−m0+m1−m3)(1− q′m3−m0+m1−m3+1) · · · (1− q′m3−m0+m1−m3+m0−m1−1)
=(1− q′m1−m0)(1− q′m1−m0+1) · · · (1− q′−1) = 1−O(1/q′). (124)
The relation KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} holds if and only if no basis of ImU0Pm0−m1M belongs to
the space KerKB . Since KerKB is an m3 −m0-dimensional subspace of an m3-dimensional space, the
probability of condition KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} is
(1− q′−m0)(1− q′−m0+1) · · · (1− q′−m0+m7−1) = 1−O(q′−m0+m7−1), (125)
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where m7 := dim ImPm0−m1M(= dim ImU0Pm0−m1M) = dim ImM = rankM ≤ m0 −m1. Therefore,
since q′ is sufficiently large, we obtain the desired statement.
Finally, we show that condition (F1’) implies condition (F1). Since the relation Im(K¯BU0Pm0−m1) ∩
Im H¯B = {0} can be shown easily from (F1’), we show only the relation Ker K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM =
{0} from (F1’) and (F1”). The choice of m¯0 guarantees that there exists an invertible map U4 from
Im[KBU HˆB] to F
m¯0
q′ such that U4[KBU HˆB] = [K¯BU H¯B]. Thus,
Ker K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = KerU−14 K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0}. (126)
Remark 10. Our proof is different from the proof presented in [12, Section VII][13, Section VI][15,
Section IV-C]. They suggested that (m0 −m1)m0 + 1 be chosen as m because they employ the concept
of list decoding. However, our discussion allows us to choose a much smaller value m0 + 1 as m. This
fact shows that our evaluation is better than their evaluation in this sense. Note that our evaluation does
not use list decoding.
Proposition 4 requires a finite field Fq′ with an infinitely large q
′. The paper [16, Appendix D] discussed
the construction of F2t whose multiplication and inverse multiplication have calculation complexity
O(t log t)4.
APPENDIX B
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE ATTACK IN ONE HOP RELAY NETWORK (FIG. 1)
First, we calculate I(M ; Y1, Y3) and d1(M |Y1, Y3). We find that
PY1,Y3|M(0, 0|0) = PY1,Y3|M(1, 0|0) =
1
2
,
PY1,Y3|M(0, 0|1) = PY1,Y3|M(1, 1|1) =
1
2
,
where the remaining conditional probabilities are zero. Hence,
H(Y1, Y3|M) = 1, H(Y1, Y3) = 1
2
log 2 +
1
2
log 4 =
3
2
,
which implies I(M ; Y1, Y3) =
1
2
.
Since
PY1,Y3(0, 0) =
1
2
, PY1,Y3(1, 0) = PY1,Y3(1, 1) =
1
4
,
we have
PM |Y1,Y3(0|0, 0) = PM |Y1,Y3(1|0, 0) =
1
2
,
PM |Y1,Y3(0|1, 0) = PM |Y1,Y3(1|1, 1) = 1,
where the remaining conditional probabilities are zero. Therefore,
d1(M |Y1, Y3)
=
∣∣∣1
2
P (0, 0)− 1
2
P (0|0, 0)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 0)− 1
2
P (0|1, 0)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 1)− 1
2
P (0|1, 1)
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣1
2
P (0, 0)− 1
2
P (1|0, 0)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 0)− 1
2
P (1|1, 0)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 1)− 1
2
P (1|1, 1)
∣∣∣
=0 +
1
8
+
1
8
+ 0 +
1
8
+
1
8
=
1
2
.
4The multiplication of elements v and z of F2t is essentially given in (124) of [16] by using Fourier transform via a calculation on
circulant matrices. For the inverse multiplication of an element v of F2t , we calculate F
−1[−Fv. ∗Fz] instead of F−1[Fv. ∗Fz] in (124),
where F is discrete Fourier transform.
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Replacing M and L by M + 1 and L+ 1, respectively, we can calculate I(M ; Y1, Y4) and d1(M |Y1, Y4)
in the same way.
Next, we consider I(M ; Y2, Y3) and d1(M |Y2, Y3). We find that
PY2,Y3|M(0, 0|0) = PY2,Y3|M(1, 0|0) =
1
2
,
PY2,Y3|M(0, 1|1) = PY2,Y3|M(1, 0|1) =
1
2
,
where the remaining conditional probabilities are zero. Hence, replacing (0, 0) and (1, 1) by (1, 0) and
(0, 1), respectively, in the above derivation, we can show I(M ; Y2, Y3) =
1
2
and d1(M |Y2, Y3) = 12 . Finally,
replacing M and L by M + 1 and L + 1, respectively, we can calculate I(M ; Y2, Y4) and d1(M |Y2, Y4)
in the same way.
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